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Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms

J. Internacional: Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: An Analysis of European Family Firms

MAURICIO JARA B., FELIX LOPEZ-ITURRIAGA.

2011 - Journal of Centrum Cathedra - Vol. 4 , N° 1, Pp. 100-120

Abstract

In this paper, the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in family-owned firms is analyzed using a sample of firms from nine European countries. How contests for control for the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned firms affect earnings management is considered. It was found that increases in the contestability of control by the largest shareholder reduce earnings management in family-owned firms. The results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family member, a second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals.

Keywords

Corporate control, discretionary accruals, earnings management, family firms.

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