Fecha: Martes 20 de agosto
Sala: H-004
Hora: 14:00hrs
Presenta: Daniel Ferrés, Universidad de Montevideo (Uruguay)
Abstract
In 2010, major Silicon Valley technology firms faced antitrust action for engaging in anti-poaching agreements. We show that firm-pairs with active bilateral agreements
to not poach each other’s employees experienced lower inventor cross-flow rates than concurrent cross-flows with comparable non-collusive firms. Accordingly,
anti-poaching firms produced superior innovation output along diverging paths, particularly in technology areas covered by the agreements. These dynamics
were reversed following the agreements’ dissolution. Event-study tests around the dissolution show a negative stock returns response. Our results reveal important
linkages between reduced employee turnover arising from firms’ anticompetitive labor market conduct and their innovation and market valuations.
Área: Finanzas
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